An Examen of a (Forthcoming) Doctoral Dissertation (2)(please make sure “java-scripting” is enabled in order for the tool-tips to function properly; mouse-hover on the yellow rectangular image to open; left-click on the image to hold). Page 21—Velez de Cea—The Significance of Atta as Island and Refuge. Without getting into a philological debate... • [Editorial Note]: A wise decision, all things considered, as not only are the nouns attadīpā and
attasaraṇā appositional It does appear that the Spanish Jesuit Father’s case trumps what the ...um... the Spanish Doctoral
Dissertator ...as to whether it is legitimate to translate attā as ‘the self’, instead of simply ‘oneself’,... • [Editorial Note]: Given the syntactic appositional context of “attadīpā” and “attasaranā” vis-à-vis “dhammadīpā” and “dhammasaraṇā” (which is the very grammatical point Señor Joaquin Pérez-Remón is cogently making and which Señor Abraham Velez de Cea is self-admittedly not “getting into”, albeit, under the guise of it being debatable despite its syntactic correctness) there is no [quote] “simply” [endquote] about translating the non-accented “atta” of those two compound words ‘atta-dīpā’ and ‘atta-saranā’ as a reflexive first-person pronoun (i.e., as an impermanent-evanescent-transitory panc’upādāna-kkhandhā personage). On the contrary—given the very nature of that brahmacariya lifestyle (an austere, chaste and rigorous religio-spiritual and/or religio-mystical way to an acausal, atemporal, aspatial, aphenomenal immortality) so punctiliously spelled-out and practiced by its founder and followers—what is actually simple is to render “atta” as ‘self’ or ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’. Also, and even more to this point, those ‘oneself’ or ‘myself’ or ‘himself’ or ‘herself’ reflexive pronoun renderings are so convoluted and convolved as to require many, many explanatory and/or justificatory and/or excusatory articles, essays, theses, dissertations, books, volumes, discourses, lectures, expositions, dialogues, sermons and etcetera, over many, many years, with still with no end in sight, such that a world-wide buddhistic industry has grown up around this more than two millenniums-old confected issue. ...or into hermeneutic dispute... • [Editorial Note]: As the phrase “hermeneutic dispute” is a pedantic way of referring to what is actually an interpretive altercation an aspirant professor is having with a learned Jesuit at the University of Deusto (“hermeneutic” = interpretive, and “dispute” = altercation) an underlying adversarial attitude becomes evident upon closer inspection. Whereas, for example, an expositive interchange (‘expositive’ = elucidative, and ‘dialogue’ = interchange) betwixt fellow human beings bent on advancing human knowledge is by far the more gentlemanly pursuit (bordering on a genteel pastime, in fact). ...about whether the ‘self’ supposedly referred to in this passage... • [Editorial Note]: As there is no “supposedly” about it—this passage specifically refers to ‘self’ (i.e., “atta”) twice; viz.: “attadīpā viharatha attasaranā”—then this usage of “supposedly” is entirely unjustifiable. ...is meant to be a permanent and eternal individual ‘I’... • [Editorial Note]: That is a misrepresentation; an “individual ‘I’” = ahaṃ (i.e., ego) and, as such, is impermanent and transient, by its very nature, whereas a permanent and eternal ‘self’ (i.e., atta as ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’) is as such by its very definition. ...(as Perez-Remon seems to believe on the basis of Christian philosophical premises) ... • [Editorial Note]: Whether true or not this is but a gratuitous slur, delivered en passant after a studious misrepresentation, as it could as easily be said, for example, “as Velez de Cea seems to believe on the basis of Buddhist philosophical premises”. ...or a universal ‘I’... • [Editorial Note]: That is the same misrepresentation, albeit this time with an invalid universalisation, of a first-person singular pronoun, into a being a group noun. ...(as A. K. Coomaraswamy • [Editorial Note]: Another gratuitous slur, delivered en passant after another studious misrepresentation, as it could as easily be said, for example, “as Velez de Cea maintains from a neo-Buddhistic point of view”. ...let us admit, for argument’s sake, that the atmanic translation is, at least, philologically acceptable and consider some of the problems it raises. • [Editorial Note]: Well now, a grudging admittance of the appositional syntactic equivalence of atta & dhamma—albeit pre-judged by those inculpatory “seems to believe on the basis of...[an author’s personal faith]” and “maintain from a...[two authors’ personal faith]...point of view” hidden-agenda denigrators and these purely-academic “for argument’s sake...” and “...at least” pre-emptive qualifiers (in conjunction with those half-a-dozen wiggles and waggles, further above, in order to avert having to actually address a cogent grammatical point on the grounds that to do so also includes acceptance of the “atmanic interpretation” even though such acceptance does not)—is better than none at all. Howsoever, it remains to be seen just how Señor Abraham Velez de Cea is now going to manoeuvre his way around his grudging admittance via his considerations of “some of the problems”—which, he forthwith asserts, this “philologically acceptable” syntactic equivalence raises—so as to sooner get back to propagandistically promoting a particular buddhistic sect’s ignoble seven-fold towpath to punditries. Given the above display of avoidance extraordinaire—with ten evasions packed into just the one sentence it may yet qualify for a world’s best (á la Sir Humphrey Appleby of “Yes Minister” fame)—his considerations are not at all likely to be in any way educational as Señor Joaquin Pérez-Remón is indeed syntactically correct in regards to the appositional nature of that well-known “dwell with atta & dhamma as your island & refuge with no other” pericope. The atmanic translation of the passage in question assumes that Dhamma is the same as
attā • [Editorial Note]: Those edifying “who sees me [“maṃ”] sees dhamma...&c.” self-referential words of open invitation (as in what “ehipassika” conveys) means, of course, that no such assumption is required (and neither is an “atmanic interpretation” required, either, for that matter). What Señor Joaquin Pérez-Remón has provided is syntactical validation that the Pāli ‘maṃ’—an accusative
case The atmanic interpretation... • [Editorial Note]: As the ātman/ ātmā of Vedanta is not identical to the attan/ atta of Buddhism, because of obvious metaphysical-metempirical doctrinal differences, this “atmanic interpretation” is invalid. ...would seem to maintain that if the Buddha exhorts his disciples to take attā and Dhamma as an island and refuge, those two terms, Dhamma and attā, denote the same reality. • [Editorial Note]: !Bingo! that is indeed what the Pāli phrase “panc’kkhandha anattā” (i.e., “the five components of personage are not-self/ are not the self”) quite evidentially refers to. Now this identity or equivalence assumed in the atmanic translation is highly problematic because it makes the Pali texts contradict themselves. • [Editorial Note]: Manoeuvre № 1: Quite obviously, the bare assertion [quote] “because it makes...” [endquote], presented here as if a fact, is going to be dependent upon whatever textual evidence is hereafter adduced, for its validation, thereby justifiably validating it; equally obvious is that, if whatever textual evidence that may be adduced does not validate the so-far bare assertion, then not only is it not “highly problematic” after all (that is, apart from the invalidity of the “atmanic interpretation” due to doctrinal differences) but it is then the first of the alleged [quote] “problems it raises” [endquote] to not be one of those alleged “problems” as well. If the passage, “attadīpā viharatha attasaranā anaññasaraṇā, dhammadīpā dhammasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā”, implies that Dhamma and attā are one and the same thing, this means that there is at least one dhamma which is attā, which is in clear contradiction of the Buddha’s other statement that ‘sabbe dhamme anattā’ (all dhammas are non-attā). • [Editorial Note]: And this manoeuvre № 1 is that “mental-gymnastics” (i.e., “regarding word-meaning ascriptions, and convoluted contextual analysis”), already mentioned further above, in action ... to wit: that the (plural) term “sabbe dhamme”, a.k.a. ‘sabbe dhammā’, supposedly includes that acausal, atemporal, aspatial, aphenomenal dhamma/ brahma (singular)—known as ‘Truth’ in English—which a sammāsambuddha is the much venerated embodiment of (as per those edifying “who sees me sees dhamma...&c.” self-referential words of open invitation and those ‘dhammabhūto’ and ‘brahmabhūto’ epithets which literally mean ‘[has]-become-dhamma’ and ‘[has]-become-brahma’). First and foremost, then, in the Mūlaka/ Mula Sutta (AN 10.58; PTS: A v
106) the sammāsambuddha—upon having
been specifically asked by some unidentified “bhikkhave” (i.e., mendicant renunciates of his own order)
to expound on ten questions which
“aññatitthiyā paribbājakā” (i.e., wandering religieux of another faith) might ask them—reveals
the illuminative gnostic wisdom
(i.e., intuitive/ metempirical wisdom as contrasted to dianoetic Now, if (note ‘if’) the phrase “sabbe dhammā” was to be inclusive of nibbāna, and given that nibbāna is the complete end of ‘sabbe dhammā’, then it would mean that nibbāna would be the complete end of ... (wait for it) ... the complete end of nibbāna! (As an aside: it would appear that whatever it takes to qualify for a “PhD.” these days—apart from fluently translating into English, from the Spanish original, a “(forthcoming) doctoral dissertation” entitled “La filosofía del Buddha según los sermones Pali” (=‘The philosophy of the Buddha according to the Pali sermons’)—it does not include much in the way of critical thinking skills because the above absurdity is quite readily apparent). Obviously, then, what the sammāsambuddha was actually conveying in the above Mūlaka/ Mula Sutta is how the attainment of immortality (i.e., amata/ amara, a.k.a. deathless, which is synonymous with nibbāna inasmuch the attainment of the one is, simultaneously, the obtention of the other) is the complete end [“pariyosānā”] of absolutely all [“sabbe”] causal-temporal-spatial phenomena [“dhammā”]. Put differently: nibbāna (i.e., immortality/ deathless) is the complete end [“pariyosānā”] of all space, all time, and all matter (mass/ energy) both animate and inanimate [“sabbe dhammā”]. For the sake of clarity in communication: the region, place or state of immortality (i.e., amata-pada, amata-dhātu), then, is an acausal-atemporal-aspatial-aphenomenal alterity; and the following is what various dictionaries have to say about that last word (i.e., alterity). Viz.:
In short, amata/ amara/ nibbāna is an utter otherness—totally,
completely and absolutely other than space, time, and matter (mass/ energy)—as is also expressly spelled-out in detail, for example,
in the illuminative “1st Nibbāna Udāna” (Ud 8.1;
PTS: Ud 80) alternatively titled “Parinibbāna Udāna” * Second, this revelation that nibbāna is the complete end of ‘sabbe dhammā’ has an earlier advent, by the sammāsambuddha, in the 3rd & 4th pada, of the last stanza in Dialogue 6 of the Pārāyanavagga, titled “Upasiva-manava-puccha” (Sn 5.6; PTS: Sn 1076). Viz.:
As “sabbesu dhammesu” = ‘sabbe dhammā’—and as “samohatesu”, repeated at the beginning of the last line as “samūhata” (and, from alternate manuscripts, transcribed as “samuhatesu” elsewhere), being the past participle of ‘samūhanati’ (“to remove, to abolish”. ~ ᴘᴛs-ᴘᴇᴅ), translates as ‘removed, abolished’—then what the sammāsambuddha is advising therein is how, with all phenomena abolished, removed, then all ways of speaking about nibbāna/ amata/ amara are also removed, abolished (“vādapatha” means: “way of speech”, i.e.: “signs of recognition, attribute, definition”. ~ ᴘᴛs-ᴘᴇᴅ). And because the Pārāyanavagga is amongst the earliest recorded portions of the buddhavacana—if not the earliest—then it is demonstrably evident that any notion about ‘sabbe dhammā’ being inclusive of nibbāna can only be a much later addition (as in, an Abhidhamma & Commentarial artefact, for instance). Besides which, as nowhere in the buddhavacana is it recorded that either nibbāna or amata/ amara is anattā (i.e. ‘not-self’, ‘not the self’), then the abject craftiness of such a convoluted way of thinking—setting out to conceive of a diṭṭhi/ dṛṣti about the ineffable/ indefinable nature of nibbāna in spite of the silence of the sammāsambuddha on the topic, via sneaking it into “sabbe dhammā”—should in itself trigger-off flashing red-light warnings to both the instigators and the perpetuators. * Third, in the Sabba Sutta (SN 35.23; PTS: SN iv 15) the sammāsambuddha details what he is referring to when he uses the Pāli word “sabbaṃ” (which is the neuter case of the adjective ‘sabba’). The ᴘᴛs-ᴘᴇᴅ defines ‘sabbaṃ’ as “the (whole) world of sense-experience” and ‘sabba’ as “whole, entire; all, every” (‘sabbe’ is the nominative plural of ‘sabba’). Also, the Pāli ‘sabba’ is identical to the Sanskrit-Vedic adjective ‘sarva’ (which also means “whole, entire, all, every”, according to the ᴍᴍᴡ-sᴇᴅ). Viz.:
In the above Sabba Sutta the sammāsambuddha specifies that when he uses the term “sabbaṃ” he is referring
to the eye [“cakkhu”] and whatsoever it sees [“rūpā”]; the ear [“sota”] and all of its sounds [“saddā”]; the nose [“ghāna”]
and everything it smells [“gandhā”]; the tongue [“jivhā”] and all of its tastes [“rasā”]; the body [“kāyo”] and its every
aesthesis Thus the term ‘sabbe’ (in that phrase “sabbe dhamme anattā”/ “sabbe dhammā anattā”), whilst denotational of absolutely everything whichsoever and everybody whomsoever, without exception, of each and every material or mental nature possible—(taking place anywhere and everywhere wheresoever in the boundlessness of space and occurring anywhen and everywhen whensoever in the limitlessness of time plus happening anyhow and everyway howsoever in which anything and everything whatsoever can eventuate whencesoever at anyplace and everyplace whithersoever)—specifically excludes that which, being beyond the scope, range or reach (of eyes, ears, mind, &c.), is ineffable/ indefinable. * Fourth, as that phrase—“sabbe dhamme anattā”/ “sabbe dhammā anattā”—most certainly is “rare in the
earliest literature”, as indirectly alluded to by Dr. Steven Collins on Page 141 of ‘Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities’, per
footnote № 9 __________ • Instance № 1.: In the Channa Sutta (SN 22.90; PTS: SN iii 132) some unnamed “therā bhikkhū” (i.e.,
senior mendicant renunciates) inform “āyasmā channo” (i.e., Venerable Channa), upon being asked by him
for “dhammiṃ
kathaṃ” (i.e., dhamma talk), that: [quote] “rūpaṃ kho āvuso
channa, aniccaṃ, vedanā aniccā, saññā
aniccā, saṃkhārā aniccā, viññāṇaṃ aniccaṃ, rūpaṃ anantā, vedanā
anattā, saññā anattā, saṃkhārā anattā, viññāṇaṃ anattā, sabbe
saṃkhārā aniccā, sabbe dhammā anattā”ti. What they are conveying, in effect, is that the five fuelled components constituting personage, the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā, are impermanent-evanescent-transitory [“aniccā”], and not-self [“anattā”], as in, not the self; and that all [“sabbe”] wilful conations [“saṃkhārā”]—which automatically become deterministic (the buddhistic ‘kamma’ is a particular form of determinism)—are impermanent-evanescent-transitory [“aniccā”]; plus all [“sabbe”] phenomena [“dhammā”] are not-self [“anattā”], as in, not the self. As that panc’upādāna-kkhandhā context itself clearly shows, the above “dhammā” (plural) which those “therā bhikkhū” were referring to as being not-self/ not the self are, quite evidentially, all those which are of a causal-temporal-spatial nature—a.k.a. phenomena (plural), in English, as opposed to noumena (plural)—and, as such, is contextually exclusive of that which is of an acausal-atemporal-aspatial-aphenomenal character (which, being beyond the scope, range or reach (of eyes, ears, mind, &c.), is ineffable/ indefinable). __________ • Instance № 2.: In the Cūḷasaccaka Sutta (MN 35; PTS: MN i
227) it is “āyasmā assaji” (i.e.,
Venerable Assaji) who informs “saccako nigaṇṭhaputto” (i.e., Saccaka the Nigaṇṭha-son),
upon being asked by him what “anusāsanī” (i.e., instructions, teachings) are given by “samaṇo gotamo” (i.e., Gotama the Recluse), that he instructs/ teaches
in this way: [quote] “Rūpaṃ bhikkhave aniccaṃ, vedanā aniccā, saññā aniccā,
saṅkhārā
aniccā, viññāṇaṃ aniccaṃ. Rūpaṃ bhikkhave anattā, vedanā anattā, saññā anattā,
saṅkhārā anattā, viññāṇaṃ anattā. Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, sabbe dhammā
anattā”ti. As this is virtually the same text as in the Channa Sutta, further above, there is no point in repeating what is conveyed therein. However, in this sutta, “saccako nigaṇṭhaputto” is not satisfied with that response from “āyasmā assaji” and seeks out the sammāsambuddha himself—only to receive the exact-same reply as “āyasmā assaji” gave (above)—whereafter the sammāsambuddha eventually convinces him, regarding each and every one of those panc’upādāna-kkhandhā (i.e., those five fuelled components constituting personage), each of which “saccako nigaṇṭhaputto” had been maintaining, up until then, was indeed his self [viz.: “rūpaṃ me attā, vedanā me attā, saññā me attā, saṅkhārā me attā, viññāṇaṃ me attā”], via question and answer, component-by-component, that “this is not mine; this I am not; this is not my self” [viz.: “netaṃ mama, neso hamasmi, nameso attā”]. Again, the contextual evidence (i.e., the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā context) —and in this sutta there is extensive and comprehensive context to fruitfully examine in this very respect, component-by-component, due to the very nature of the convincement process, in and of itself, which is employed to such good effect by the sammāsambuddha —demonstrates that the “dhammā” (plural) being referred to are indubitably all those which are of a causal-temporal-spatial nature (which, of course, not being beyond the scope, range or reach (of eyes, ears, mind, &c.), are effable/ definable). * What is of import in this sutta is how the sammāsambuddha—by virtue of the very nature
of the question and answer, component-by-component, convincement process, in and of itself—delineates for all time three essential properties
[“tilakkhaṇaṃ”]
of [quote] “attā” [endquote]; namely: (1) vasa (‘power, authority, control, influence’. ~ ᴘᴛs-ᴘᴇᴅ); 2. nicca
(‘constant, continuous, permanent’ & ‘perpetually, constantly, always’.
~ ᴘᴛs-ᴘᴇᴅ); and (3) sukha (which,
being the very opposite of dukkha In regards to “vasa”, that first property of [quote] “attā” [endquote] delineated by the sammāsambuddha, here is the relevant section of the initial question he asks of “saccako nigaṇṭhaputto” (in Pāli) with the operative words highlighted for convenience:
And here is what the Pāli Text Society’s Pāli-English Dictionary has to say about that highlighted phrase (minus “rūpe”, of course, as here it applies to all five fuelled components of personage):
Here, then, is the above Pāli original rendered in English:
The same Q&A applies to the other four fuelled components of personage ... namely: 2. hedonic-tone [“vedanā”]; 3. agnition
[“saññā”]; 4. (wilful) conation [“saṅkhāra”]; 5. worldly
(‘intoxicated with life’) percipience [“viññāṇa”].
As this Q&A sequence about the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā (i.e., the five fuelled components constituting personage), in respect to power/ control [“vasa”], is of the same ilk as the Q&A sequences about “panc’upādāna-kkhandhā anattā” (i.e., about how the five fuelled components constituting personage are not-self/ not the self), then this is an apt moment to point out that these Q&A sequences only make literal sense in the context of then-prevailing Vedantic wisdom regarding an immanent ātman/ ātmā—an indwelling/ all-pervasive impersonal self, the uncaused and non-dualistic origin of all space, all time, all matter (mass/energy), a source which is, simultaneously, both the creator and its creation—which immanent ātman/ ātmā would surely have, at the very least, power/ control over panc’upādāna-kkhandhā. Thus what the sammāsambuddha is engaging “saccako nigaṇṭhaputto” in, via this question and answer, component-by-component, convincement process, is the eventual acknowledgement that the ātman/ ātmā of Vedanta (the word Vedanta means “the end of Veda”, and what he *rediscovered* under that Ficus-religiosa tree, was of the Vedic period, as distinct from the Vedantic era, from over a millennia earlier) cannot possibly be immanent, as in indwelling/ all-pervasive, after all. Hence, of course, the impact which his illuminative gnostic wisdom “panc’upādāna-kkhandhā anattā” (i.e., the five fuelled components constituting personage are not-self, not the self) has had for two and a half millennia, now, and the confusion it has engendered is as prevalent today as it was back then. * The next set of questions & answers, in regards to the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā (i.e., the five fuelled components of personage), are about those properties of [quote] “attā” [endquote] numbered further above as 2. “nicca” (vis-à-vis anicca) and 3. “sukha” (vis-à-vis dukkha) and start with rūpa (i.e., bodily phenomena). Viz.:
NB: As already mentioned, ākāsa Next in the Q&A sequence comes that $64 dollar triple-question (‘is this mine; am I this; is this my self’?). Viz.:
Indeed not. The same Q&A sequence applies to the other four fuelled components of personage ... namely: 2. hedonic-tone [“vedanā”]; 3. agnition [“saññā”]; 4. (wilful) conation [“saṅkhāra”]; 5. worldly (‘intoxicated with life’) percipience [“viññāṇa”]. What follows is a very truncated version of that sequence (the “...pe...” elisions, where the Pāli “pe” translates as ‘ditto’, are in the original Pāli transcription of the manuscript). Viz.:
Now, what is so outstandingly implicit in that triple-question is, of course, that were the five fuelled components of personage to indeed be “permanent, united-joined-present with ākāsa, not subject to change” then they would be surely fit to be regarded thus: ‘etaṃ mama, eso ahaṃ asmi, eso me attā’ (i.e., ‘this is mine; this I am; this is my self’) else the triple-question would not, and never could, be the all-time clincher it so evidentially is (and not only in this sutta but in many, many others throughout the buddhavacana) such that the sammāsambuddha demonstrably was/ is unquestionably the then-living embodiment of dhamma/ brahma—known as ‘Truth’ in English—whose sacred/ gnostic utterances were therefore faithfully preserved memoriter (i.e., by rote), duly certified as being “Thus have I heard” (“evaṃ me sutaṃ”), in sacrosanct scriptures known in Pāli as ‘suttanta’ and in Sanskrit as ‘sūtrānta’, and it is anybody’s guess as to how many devout peoples, down through two and a half millennia or so, have had a hand in reverentially preserving and respectfully passing-them-on unto the present generation. Yet despite all this there have been no arahants—arahants of the ilk described and delineated in the buddhavacana that is—for 2,000+ years. It is recorded, in Pali text, in the Mahāvaṃsa (Mhv./Mhvs.) that the “last arahant”, Maliya Deva Thero, lived during the time of King Dutugamunu (101-77 BCE). A few quotes and URL’s from an internet search:
Chapter four, particularly pages 136-142, in the book ‘The Buddhist Revival in Sri Lanka’ (by George D. Bond, 1988) is quite informative on this topic. Viz.: [http://books.google.com/books?id=Q11ID2xfqD8C&q=last+arahant]. __________ • Instance № 3.: In the Uppādā Sutta (AN 3.136 a.k.a. 3.134; PTS: A i 286) the sammāsambuddha essentially says, twice-over, that—regardless of the coming into existence [“uppādā”] or not [“anupādā”] of a Tathāgata—each and every [“sabbe”] wilful conative activity [“saṇkhārā”] are both impermanent-evanescent-transitory [“aniccā”] and asunder-apart-away from ākāsa [“dukkhā”] plus all [“sabbe”] phenomena [“dhammā”] are not-self [“anattā”], as in, not the self. Because the Uppādā Sutta is so short it can be re-presented here in full (with each twice-over phrase highlighted for convenience). Viz.:
As the only essential difference between this sutta and the two previous ones is the added information that all “saṅkhārā” are “dukkhā” as well as “aniccā”—by being deterministic (‘kamma’ is a buddhistic form of determinism) all wilful conative activities are patently asunder-apart-away from ākāsa—then it is self-evident that the same “dhammā” (plural) being referred to here are also those of a causal-temporal-spatial nature (which, once again, not being beyond the scope, range or reach (of eyes, ears, mind, &c.), are indeed effable/ definable). __________ • Instance № 4.: In the Ānanda a.k.a. Atthatta Sutta (SN 44.10; PTS S iv 400) the sammāsambuddha remains silent, when asked by “vacchagotto paribbājaka” (i.e., Vacchagotta the Wandering Religieux) whether there is indeed a self/ soul/ spirit [viz.: “kiṃ nu kho, bho gotama, atthattā?”] or, to the contrary, there is no-self/ no-soul/ no-spirit [viz.: “Kiṃ pana, bho gotama, natthattā?”] and because of his silence, a short while after the wandering religieux departs, “āyasmā ānando” (i.e., Venerable Ānanda) enquires as to why the sammāsambuddha did not answer when asked either question. By way of explanation, the sammāsambuddha indicates that the wandering religieux [“paribbājaka”] would have taken an affirmative answer as “bho gotama” (i.e., ‘Sir Gotama’) thus siding with exponents of eternalism [“sassatavādā”] and a negative answer to be him siding with those of annihilationism [“ucchedavādā”]. He also explains that answering in the affirmative would not have been suitable or fit [“anulomaṃ”] for the wandering religieux to be taking up [“uppādāya”] the intuitive/ metempirical wisdom [“ñāṇassa”] that all phenomena are not-self/ not-soul/ not-spirit [“sabbe dhammā anattā”]—as in, not the self/ not the soul/ not the spirit—and finishes by illustrating how, were he to have answered in the negative, his questioner would have been even more confused/ bewildered [“bhiyyo sammohāya abhavissa”] than already by saying, in effect, he would have been thinking: ‘That self/ soul/ spirit of mine, which in the past did indeed exist, is now not present’ [viz.: “ahuvā me nūna pubbe attā, so etarahi natthī”]. What is of immediate import, in this sutta, is his explication in regards to the correspondence between ‘no-self’/ ‘no-soul’/ ‘no-spirit’ [“natthattā”] and ‘annihilationism’ [“ucchedavādā”]. Thus any so-called “doctrine of no-self”/ “doctrine of no-soul”/ “doctrine of no-spirit” (as might read ‘natthattā-vāda’ as it were)—and particularly the one ubiquitously slipped-in under the guise of “the doctrine of anattā” (as might read ‘anattā-vāda’ as it were)—corresponds to the ‘doctrine of annihilation’ (such as what materialist’s champion, for instance, as opposed to what religionist’s espouse) and, hence, a ‘micchā-diṭṭhi’ (Pāli), a ‘dṛṣṭika’ (Sanskrit) or, in English, a wrong view. As a matter of related interest: the sammāsambuddha elsewhere emphasises the primacy of not having a diṭṭhi/ dṛṣti of either being [“bhāva-diṭṭhi”] or not-being [“vibhāva-diṭṭhi”] as well—elucidating that ‘bhāva-diṭṭhi’ corresponds with eternalism [“sassatavādā”] and that ‘vibhāva-diṭṭhi’ corresponds with annihilationism [“ucchedavādā”]—and it is here where it is critical to be aware that the buddhavacana is not to be divorced from its Vedic roots. Those who seek to comprehend the buddhavacana via an understanding of, for instance, the (expatriate) Sinhalese, Burmese, Siamese and Cambodian iterations—disembedded from those very roots, uprooted from its (Vedic) soil, grafted onto exoteric root-stock—can only be illuding themselves that they thus know what the sammāsambuddha *rediscovered* (described by him in the Nagara Sutta (SN 12.65; PTS: S ii 104) as an ancient path, an ancient road, travelled by each sammā sambuddha of former times) under a particular assattha/ pippal tree (Ficus-religiosa), around two and a half millennia ago. As briefly as possible: the ethereal/ empyreal brahmā dimension (or realm, plane, world and so on), which the
unawakened/ unenlightened Mr. Siddhattho Gotama learnt how to attain to from Mr. Uddaka Rāmaputta (and known in Pāli as
“nevasaññānāsaññāyatana”, the fourth arūpa-samāpatti of the ascending abodes [“anupubbavihārā”], those
introversive and/ or mystical self-absorption states, accessible via the 8th-stage ‘sammā-samadhi’) corresponds to the description of the
nature of the unmanifest mind/ the unestablished consciousness in the Ṛgveda—the Vedic words “nâsad āsīn nó sád āsīt
tadâniṃ”, in the well-known-in-the-west Nāsadīya Sūkta (Ṛgveda 10:
129 Which in turn, of course, corresponds to what has become known as the Buddhist tetralemma (a.k.a. Sanskrit ‘catuṣkoṭi’) regarding the nature of amata-pada (the deathless state) ... to wit: 1. “hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā” (‘tathāgata exists after death’); 2. “na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā” (‘tathāgata does not exist after death’); 3. “hoti ca na ca hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā” (‘tathāgata both exists and does not exist after death’); 4. “n’eva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā” (‘tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist after death’). Now, mystical literature in general often mentions how the polar opposites continue to subsist (as complimentary poles)
in religio-spiritual and/or mystico-metempirical * What is of equally valuable import, in this Ānanda/ Atthatta Sutta, is the clear distinction betwixt not-self/ not-soul/ not-spirit [“anattā”], as in, “not the self”/ “not the soul”/ “not the spirit”, and no-self/ no-soul/ no-spirit [“natthattā”], as in, “no self”/ “no soul”/ “no spirit”. What follows is the Pāli original, in full, with all five instances of “natthattā” (i.e., no-self/ no-soul/ no-spirit) highlighted for convenience of comparison with the one instance of “anattā” (i.e., not-self/ not-soul/ not-spirit). It will be immediately noticeable that the sammāsambuddha used the word natthattā four times—each when he is referring to ‘no-self’/ ‘no-soul’/ ‘no-spirit’ as per the second question asked by the wandering religieux—and the word anattā once (when he was referring to ‘not-self’/ ‘not-soul’/ ‘not-spirit’ in regards to ‘sabbe dhammā’). Viz.:
Put succinctly: this is definitive contextual proof that the Pāli “anattā” does *not* mean ‘no-self’/ ‘no-soul’/ ‘no-spirit’ (else the sammāsambuddha would have used it instead of the word “natthattā”). * And as to that particular instance of the “sabbe dhammā anattā” phrase: the elucidation from the sammāsambuddha—that answering in the affirmative would not have been suitable, or fit, for the wandering religieux to be taking up the intuitive/ metempirical wisdom that all phenomena are not-self/ not-soul (as in, not the self/ not the soul/ not the spirit), as per the “this is not mine; this I am not; this is not my self” pericope [viz.: ‘na etaṃ mama, na eso ahaṃ asmi, na eso me attā’]—provides further contextual evidence, straight from the horse’s mouth as it were, that the “dhammā” (plural) being referred to are indeed those of a causal-temporal-spatial nature only. To explain: as answering in the affirmative would necessarily be in reference to an acausal-atemporal-aspatial-aphenomenal self [“attan/ atta”] of an ‘utterly other’ nature—an ‘absolute alterity’ in disposition; a ‘sheer otherness’ in character—then his reply could only ever have been suitable, or fit, had the wandering religieux already taken up [as in ‘upādiṇṇa’ for instance], previously, that intuitive/ metempirical wisdom (about all causal-temporal-spatial phenomena being not-self/ not-soul/ not-spirit) because, otherwise, the then-prevailing Vedantic wisdom regarding an immanent ātman/ātmā would precondition the wandering religieux to have presumed that the sammāsambuddha would have been speaking of that self-same immanent ātman/ātmā of Vedanta even though he conspicuously and distinctly would not have been. Hence the critical importance of “taking up the intuitive/ metempirical wisdom” [“ñāṇassa uppādāya”] that all phenomena are not-self/ not-soul/ not-spirit [“anattā”]. * ’Tis instructive to see how that astute observation by the sammāsambuddha, about the already-confused wandering religieux becoming even more confused had he answered the questions (hence his silence regarding any definitive utterance vis-à-vis attan/ atta), remains as valid today as two and a half millennia ago. For example: here is that specific piece of text (in Pāli):
This is how Mrs. Caroline Rhys Davids rendered it (in English):
Thus ‘anulomaṃ’ becomes “in accordance” (rather than “suitable or fit for”) and ‘ñāṇassa’ is rendered merely as “knowledge”
(with no distinction drawn between ‘dianoetic This is how Mr. Geoffrey DeGraff rendered it (in English):
Here ‘anulomaṃ’ becomes “in keeping” (rather than “suitable or fit for”) and, again, ‘ñāṇassa’ is rendered merely as “knowledge” (with, again, no distinction drawn between ‘dianoetic empirical knowledge’ and ‘intuitive metempirical wisdom’) plus the all-critical ‘uppādāya’ (“to be taking up”) has been rendered as a passive “the arising of”. Here is how Bhikkhunī Upalawanna rendered it (in English):
Hmm ... ‘anulomaṃ’ has become “straightforwardly supporting” (rather than “suitable or fit for”) and, yet again, ‘ñāṇassa’ reads merely as “knowledge” (with, yet again, no distinction drawn between ‘dianoetic empirical knowledge’ and ‘intuitive metempirical wisdom’) plus the all-critical ‘uppādāya’ (“to be taking up”) is also disregarded entirely. Here is how Mr. Jeffery Block rendered it (in English):
Well now, ‘anulomaṃ’ has become “consistent *on my part*” (rather than “suitable or fit for *the wandering religieux*”) and, yet again once more, ‘ñāṇassa’ is rendered merely as “knowledge” (with, yet again once more, no distinction drawn between ‘dianoetic empirical knowledge’ and ‘intuitive metempirical wisdom’) plus the all-critical ‘uppādāya’ (“to be taking up”) has also been rendered as a passive “the arising of”. Ha ... back in 1950 those propagators of the so-called “doctrine of anattā”—which ‘doctrine’ is, of course, nowhere to be found in the buddhavacana (i.e., “the word (teaching) of the Buddha”. ~ ᴘᴛs-ᴘᴇᴅ)—would have displayed more openness about having filled-in the silence of the sammāsambuddha, putting words into his mouth which are simply not there, by renaming their [quote] “modern ‘reformed’ Buddhism” [endquote] with a neologism such as ‘Anattāvāda’, for instance, rather than the misnomer ‘Theravāda’ (viz.: “Theravāda: the doctrine of the Theras, the *original* Buddhist doctrine; M i 164”. ~ ᴘᴛs-ᴘᴇᴅ) which name they deliberated on, in-council, and foist upon the world 61 years ago (update: now 73 years ago). * Lastly, in regards to manoeuvre № 1: because that bare assertion about the “philologically acceptable”
equivalence of atta & dhamma being [quote] “highly problematic because it makes the Pali texts
contradict themselves” [endquote]—presented
in this “(forthcoming doctoral dissertation” as if a fact—is not justifiably validated by that craftily-conceived latter-day “sabbe dhammā
anattā” diṭṭhi/ dṛṣti, which vainly attempts to define
nibbāna/ nirvāṇa as self-less, rather than
just fuel-less ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ {... cont’d from before}. To claim that Dhamma and attā are identical or equivalent renders the teaching of Dependent Origination unnecessary. • [Editorial Note]: Manoeuvre № 2: not so; the “paṭicca-samuppāda” dhamma (i.e., ‘dhamma’, as in its “the teaching” of contingent geniture connotation), is not at all rendered unnecessary by the “identical or equivalent” nature of attā and dhamma (i.e., ‘dhamma’, as its denotational “an acausal, atemporal, aspatial, aphenomenal alterity of an ‘utterly other’ nature” meaning) because it is avijjā (i.e., agnosis), on the part of entrapped viññāṇa (i.e., soul-self)—entrapped in saṁsāra (i.e., the cycle of ever-becoming) for so many saṃvaṭṭa-vivaṭṭakappa (i.e., myriad aeons) as is impossible to discern all its innumerable pubbenivāsā (i.e., past-lives; “lit. prior dwellings”. ~ ᴘᴛs-ᴘᴇᴅ)—which precipitates paṭicca-samuppāda (i.e., contingent geniture; the successively-dependent sequence whereby the gestation of an individual life takes place in utero unto parturition), via its resultant taṇhā-bhava (i.e., thirsting for becoming) with its consequential bhavesanā (i.e., longing for rebirth). Therefore, “the teaching” [“dhamma”] specifically presented in the paragraph after the next—regarding the non-visual ‘seeing’ of contingent geniture (as in, “to see paṭicca-samuppāda is to see dhamma; to see dhamma is to see paṭicca-samuppāda”, footnoted further below)—is indeed necessary else viññāṇa entrapped-in-saṁsāra remain entrapped forever and a day. Furthermore, “the teaching” [“dhamma”], regarding the comprehension of contingent geniture [“paṭicca-samuppāda”] as it is actually depicted in the buddhavacana, is also necessary else many and various writers of doctoral dissertations, and their ilk, will continue to confuse the distinctions betwixt the half-a-dozen or so denotations/ connotations ascribed to the multi-valent word ‘dhamma’—plus what the multi-referent word ‘attā’ contextually refers to—and thereby continue to perpetuate confusion amongst their readers. In effect, Dependent Origination explains suffering and the nature of things on the basis that there is no such thing as an attā that might constitute the essence, or substantive foundation of the impermanent processes that constitute a human being. • [Editorial Note]: An acausal-atemporal-aspatial-aphenomenal [quote] “attā” [endquote] of an ‘utterly other’ nature—an ‘absolute alterity’ in disposition; a ‘sheer otherness’ in character—could not be the “essence, or substantive foundation” of anything (not even of itself, of course, being acausal) and it is these single-sourced metempirics wherein Buddhism differs from the multiple-sourced and thus accumulative metaphysics of the Vedantic ātman/ ātmā of Hinduism, encrusted-on over several millennia now despite the well-recorded rediscovery by the sammāsambuddha of the ancient way (i.e., Vedic), the ancient path, known to the ṛṣī (a.k.a., ‘Rishis’) of antediluvian lore and legend, under a particular Ficus-religiosa tree, around two and a half millennia ago. But if it is assumed that in the ultimate analysis there exists in fact an attā that is the same as Dhamma, what would be the point of Dependent Origination? • [Editorial Note]: On its own this is a particularly odd query—although as a follow-up to its preceding “In effect...” explanation, which is presented as if it were already established as a fact, it is but a rhetorical question, of course, artfully articulated in order to lend credence to what is really just a bare assertion—as “the point” of paṭicca-samuppāda (i.e., contingent geniture) itself, as in its raison d’être, is that it is the means whereby jāti (i.e., post-gestation parturition) and its concomitant dukkha (i.e., by thus being asunder-apart-away from ākāsa) comes about. And therein lies the oddity of the above question—as a stand-alone query it is akin to asking what
“the point” is of, say,
the alimentary canal (a.k.a. the ‘digestive tract’) or asking what “the point” is of, say, the mammalian genitalia
(a.k.a. the ‘reproductive system’)—because the asker of the query evidentially does not comprehend that, for those peoples
inhabiting Jambudīpa somewhere around two and a half millennia ago, the successively-contingent sequence whereby the gestation of an
individual life takes place in utero unto birth (i.e., paṭicca-samuppāda) was their equivalent of what is nowadays known as
‘placental viviparity’ (a.k.a. hemotrophic viviparity (Jambudīpa, which translates as ‘the island of rose-apple trees’ [genus “Eugenia-jambolana”], is the fabled name for ancient Bhāratavarṣa, as the Indian Subcontinent was then known). Put succinctly, to characterise ‘paṭicca-samuppāda’, in and of itself, as “the teaching” is the equivalent of characterising placental viviparity , in and of itself, in the same way and to then ask, as if it were a meaningful question, what “the point” of placental viviparity is. (As briefly as possible: mammalian reproduction, a.k.a. ‘placental viviparity’, is the generative conception-gestation-parturition process involving the mitotic formation of a zygote in the fallopian tube, via the union of the male gamete (a motile spermatozoa) with the female gamete (a viable ovum), followed by uterine implantation and its subsequent placental development into an embryo, with further developmental growth as a foetus nourished per favour the nutrient-supplying/ waste-eliminating chorda umbilicalis (the aeration of the embryonic/ foetal blood, for instance, occurs in the placenta instead of in the lungs) until, upon birth, it becomes an air-breathing milk-nourished and thus urinating and defecating baby). And so, as the “philologically acceptable” equivalence of atta & dhamma does *not* render “the teaching” of contingent geniture unnecessary—and as it does *not* explain dukkha in terms of no essential and/or no substantive and/or no foundational self or soul or spirit either (it is the agnosis of entrapped viññāṇa which precipitates contingent geniture)—then the second of those alleged [quote] “problems it raises” [endquote] also turns out to not be one of those half-a-dozen so-called “problems” after all. The identification of attā and Dhamma is in direct contradiction to the Buddha’s explicit identification of Dependent Origination with Page 22—Velez de Cea—The Significance of Atta as Island and Refuge. the Dhamma when he declares that he who sees the one sees the other, and vice
versa • [Editorial Note]: Manoeuvre № 3: First and foremost, it is more than passing strange that Señor
Abraham Velez de Cea draws attention to “who sees paṭiccasamuppāda sees dhamma ...& vice-versa”, as per footnote № 17 Second, although he references [quote] “M I 191, *etc.*” [emphasis added], in footnote № 17, that particular phrase is only to be found in the Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta (MN 28; PTS: M i 184) and no other sutta (i.e., there is no etcetera to refer to). Third, contrary to his assertion it cannot be known as a [quote] “explicit identification” [endquote] of paṭicca-samuppāda with dhamma by the sammāsambuddha because, as it is said to be spoken by “āyasmā sāriputto” (i.e., Venerable Sāriputta of Upatissa)—in the form of “this has been said by Bhagavat” [viz.: “vuttaṃ kho panetaṃ bhagavatā...”; source: http://suttacentral.net/pi/mn28]—the original context, even if there ever was one, with which to derive such “explicit” certainty from does not exist. Fourth, because the context in which “āyasmā sāriputto” spoke of it, in that referential manner, was the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā and the reason for being asunder-apart-away from ākāsa—by saying that, because the very coming about [“samuppannā”] of those five fuelled components constituting personage is contingent [“paṭicca”], then the origin of dukkha [“dukkhasamudayo”] is the wanting, falling in with, hanging onto and cleaving with them [“chando ālayo anunayo ajjhosānaṃ”]—then what is contextually evident is he was not making any such [quote] “explicit identification” [endquote] of paṭicca-samuppāda with dhamma and vice-versa. Fifth, as the origin of dukkha (i.e., being asunder-away-apart from
ākāsa) is agnosis [“avidyā”] on the
part of the entrapped-in-saṁsāra soul-self [“viññāṇa
”]—not its resultant “wanting, falling in with, hanging onto and
cleaving with the five fuelled components constituting personage”—then some considerable doubt is cast upon whom the speaker of both that
phrase and the passage, which it is somewhat out-of-place in anyway, might really be because the awakened/ enlightened “āyasmā
sāriputto” (i.e., Venerable Sāriputta of Upatissa) surely knew the real origin of dukkha (whereas those many and various unawakened/ unenlightened latter-day redactors If to see the Dhamma is to see that things arise dependently, and Dependent Origination does not need to postulate a real, essential attā, it does not make much sense to claim at the same time that Dhamma and attā are the same. • [Editorial Note]: And this is an example of the crude power, which such a little word as “if...” is, can exert when utilised injudiciously regarding the basic premise (in conjunction, of course, with that other little word “and...”, when also utilised injudiciously as the secondary premise) thereby resulting in the “it does not make much sense...” conclusion. Now, to [quote] “see the Dhamma” [endquote]—in the context of seeing contingent geniture [“yo
paṭicca-samuppādaṃ passati”] is to see dhamma [“so dhammaṃ passati”] as per footnote № 17 Put succinctly: to thus ‘see’ contingent geniture is to see how you—yes ‘you’, Señor, ‘you, yourself’, as expressed by reflexive personal pronouns—came to be here, as a psychosomatic (i.e., psyche-&-soma) human being, with all what that entails. Thus, as the “philologically acceptable” equivalence of atta & dhamma is *not* in direct contradiction to “who sees paṭiccasamuppāda sees dhamma ...& vice-versa”—as it is neither an “identification” of the one with the other (let alone an “explicit” one) nor is it to see that *things* arise, either dependently or otherwise, either but, rather, agnosis on the part of entrapped viññāṇa which brings about contingent geniture (i.e., descending/ entering into the womb, establishing itself/ founding itself, in utero, via four nutriments...&c.)—then the third one of those alleged [quote] “problems it raises” [endquote] is not one of those half-a-dozen “problems” either. What is explicitly stated throughout the Pali Canon... • [Editorial Note]: An unsourceable second-hand avouchment (of perhaps questionable authorship), in one single sutta, does not constitute either “explicitly stated...” nor “throughout...” in any way, shape, or form. ...is that to see the Dhamma is to see Dependent Origination, but nowhere is anything said to the effect that seeing the Dhamma is equivalent to seeing attā. • [Editorial Note]: Manoeuvre № 4: and, yet again, this totally ignores the ... (ha! ’tis irresistible) ... the
explicit identification in those edifying self-referential words of the sammāsambuddha: [quote] “Who sees me [“maṃ”] sees dhamma;
who sees dhamma sees me [“maṃ”]” [endquote]—in the Vakkali Sutta
(SN 22.87; PTS: S iii.119) wherein he explicitly qualifies himself (the
Pāli “maṃ” is a first person singular accusative pronoun Therefore, by stipulating thereby how a non-visual ‘seeing’ is the requisite means through which dhamma/ brahma itself can be directly apprehended (i.e., experientially, that is, not intellectually)—this is indeed something “said to the effect” that seeing dhamma [quote] “is equivalent to seeing attā” [endquote]. And this is because, solely in this specific case (i.e., regarding the sammāsambuddha only), dhamma, brahma, and atta are all one and the same acausal, atemporal, aspatial, aphenomenal alterity of an ‘utterly other’ nature—known as ‘Truth’ in English—which a sammāsambuddha is the much venerated embodiment of (“much venerated”, that is, not only on account of the rarity of such an embodiment, but primarily because of what such a one is) and whose sacrosanct gnostic utterances are reverentially preserved unto the present-day. And thus does the fourth of those alleged “problems”—which the “philologically acceptable” equivalence of atta & dhamma supposedly “raises”—also turn out to not be one of those half-a-dozen alleged “problems” as well. Rather the opposite;... • [Editorial Note]: Manoeuvre № 5. ...what is explicitly declared is that the concept of attā is the consequence
of an inadequate perception of the psychophysical aggregates which constitute human reality • [Editorial Note]: As footnotes № 18 & № 19 refer the reader to the Samanupassanā Sutta (SN 22.47; PTS: S iii 46), and to PTS Page 144 in the Gomaya Sutta (SN 22.96; PTS: S iii 143), then a read-through of the relevant paragraphs alluded to (above) in the original Pāli clarifies what actually is “explicitly declared” in the former and whether it actually says (or with words to the effect) “if an attā existed” and “would not be possible (not be perceived)” in the latter. * In the Samanupassanā Sutta, the sammāsambuddha informs the religieux [“bhikkhave”] at Sāvatthī (1): the carnate/ bodily phenomena [“rūpupādāna-kkhandha”], as in the ‘soma’ of the common English word psychosomatic for instance; (2): the hedonic-tone facility [“vedanupādāna-kkhandha”], an instinctual and thus affective hedonic attraction-aversion discrimination underpinning each and every feeling-thought-action; (3): the agnitive faculty [“saññupādāna-kkhandha”], as in the autonomic (4): the conative facility [“saṅkhārupādāna-kkhandha”], the aspect of psychological processes or behaviour directed toward action or change—including impulse, desire, volition, and striving—which primarily stems from, and manifests as, a particular form of determinism called kamma (i.e., the fruit of all the feelings-thoughts-actions of the present and past lifetimes); (5): the sixfold worldly (‘intoxicated with life’) percipience process [“viññāṇupādāna-kkhandha”]—the visual [“cakkhuviññāṇa”]; audile [“sotaviññāṇa”]; olfactorial [“ghaṇaviññāṇa”]; tactile [“kāyaviññāṇa”]; gustatorial [“jivhāviññāṇa”]; and mentational [“manoviññāṇa”] components—whereby being inebriated with worldly matters ensues. In doing so these renunciates and teachers observe [“samanupassa”] those fuelled personage components as either being their self [“attato samanupassati”], or their self as possessing them [“antaṃ vā attānaṃ”], or those fuelled personage components as in their self [“attati vā”], or their self as in them [“asmiṃ vā attānaṃ”]. As this way of observation arose it occurred to them to think “I am” [“asmīti cassa avigataṃ hoti”], and, in thinking “I am”, there comes descent into the five sense faculties [“pañcannaṃ indriyānaṃ avakkanti hoti”: lit. “there comes descent”]; namely: the faculties of eye [“cakkhunadriyassa”], ear [“sotaindriyassa”], nose [“ghaṇindriyassa”], tongue [“jivhindriyassa”], and body [“kāyindriyassa”]. Then the sammāsambuddha informed the religieux [“bhikkhave”] that there is the mind [“tatthi mano”], there are
ideas (mental qualities) [“atthi dhammā”], there is the property of ignorance [“atthi avijjādhātu”], and to an uninstructed
worldling, touched by experience [“vedayitena”] born of the contact of ignorance, there occur the thoughts: “I am”
[“asmīti’pissa hoti”],
“This is my self”, “I will be” [“ayamahamasmīti’pissa hoti”], “I shall not be” [“bhavissanti pi’ssa hoti”], “I will be material”
[“rūpī bhavissanti’pissa hoti”], “I shall be immaterial” For the run-of-the-mill worldling [“puthujjano”] these five faculties continue as they were [“tiṭṭhanteva
kho tattheva pañcindriyāni”]. But for a developed ariyan So, what actually is [quote] “explicitly declared” [endquote] in the above sermon is how the ordinary everyday person regards their self—a commonplace run-of-the-mill human being in whom the five fuelled components constituting personage [“panc’upādāna-kkhandhā”] are intact and reigning supreme—and, as such, does nothing to demonstrate that nowhere is anything said, to the effect, that “seeing the Dhamma is equivalent to seeing attā”, as claimed by Señor Abraham Velez de Cea (nor does it disprove anything which might be said to that effect, either, for that matter). ’Tis an (unscholarly) non-sequitur, in fact. As a memory-refresher, here is what that aspirant PhD dissertationist wrote (from further above):
Needless is it to add that a “concept of attā” (and in ordinary everyday persons at that) is categorically different to the experiential reality of an (egoless) soul-self. * Regarding the Gomaya Sutta: first and foremost it is a variation on the same theme as in the Nakhasikhopama Sutta (SN 22.97; PTS: S iii 147) and the Suddhika Sutta (SN 22.98; PTS: S iii 149) inasmuch featuring in each sutta is an “aññataro bhikkhu” (i.e., any of the mendicant renunciates; not one in particular) who enquires as to whether any of the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā are permanent [“niccaṃ”], stable [“dhuvaṃ”], perpetual [“sassataṃ”] and thus able, through not being subject to change [“avipariṇāmadhammaṃ”], to endure [“ṭhassati”] for ever and ever [“sassatisama”] in this way [“tatheva”], and the sammāsambuddha unambiguously replies in the negative in each sutta. In both the Nakhasikhopama Sutta and the Suddhika Sutta he then picks up an insignificant [“parittaṃ”] piece of dust/ dirt/ soil [“paṃsuṃ”] on the tip of his nail [“nakhasikhāyaṃ”; i.e., “nakha” = nail & “sikhā” = tip] and uses its minute size to illustrate how not even that much of any of the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā fits such a description. In the Gomaya Sutta—in both Pāli and Sanskrit ‘gomaya’ refers to the faeces of cattle (colloquially: “cow-dung”)—he picks up an insignificant piece of kine faecal matter [“paritta gomayapiṇḍaṃ”] instead and uses its minute size to illustrate how not even that much of obtaining/ taking up [“paṭilābha”] individuality/ an individual state [“attabhāva”] fits such a description which, upon bearing in mind that illuminative gnostic wisdom “panc’upādāna-kkhandhā anattā” (i.e., the five fuelled components of personage are not-self/ not the self), already quoted much further above, is indeed the case. So far all the above is in keeping with what the sammāsambuddha has elsewhere revealed in many, many a sutta. However, in both the Gomaya Sutta and Nakhasikhopama Sutta he then goes on to say that were even such a minute amount to fit the description then the mendicant renunciate life-style [“brahmacariyavāso”]—the ages-old quest for immortality (i.e., amṛta, in Vedic and Sanskrit (from “√ṃr”), and amata/ amara, in Pāli) via an austere, celibate and rigorous religio-spiritual/ religio-mystical life-style—and thereby enabling the complete ending of being asunder-apart-away from ākāsa [“sammā dukkhakkhayāya”], would not be clear or evident/ not be perceived [“paññāyetha”] but, because this is not the case, then both that brahmacariya life-style and, thereby, that complete ending (to being asunder-apart-away from ākāsa) is clear and evident/ is to be perceived [“paññāyati”]. Thus, in effect the sammāsambuddha is also emphasising how not even a speck of the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā (i.e., the five fuelled components of personage) is fit to be regarded thus: ‘etaṃ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’ (i.e., ‘this is mine; this I am; this is my self’). Howsoever, it is the Pāli word “paññāyetha” which Señor Abraham Velez de Cea is somewhat obliquely inferring from—as his parenthesised “(not be perceived)” words, as per the regular English translation, are indicative of—when he asserted that what is [quote] “explicitly declared” [endquote] is that if [quote] “an attā” [endquote] existed then liberation from dukkha [quote] “would not be possible (not be perceived)” [endquote]. Viz.
As the accented Pāli word “attā” (as per his above “if an attā existed” wording) does not feature at all on PTS Page 144 of the Gomaya Sutta then it is, quite obviously, none other than the compounded Pāli word “attabhāvapaṭilābha” [“attabhāva” + “paṭilābha”]—rendered as “obtaining/ taking up” [“paṭilābha”] individuality/ an individual state [“attabhāva”]” in the summary of the Gomaya Sutta further above—upon which the validity of that second “explicitly declared” assertion of his either stands or falls. Even though it should be self-evident by now, simply from the comprehension engendered via the above summary, that its validity does *not* stand, of course (none of them ever stand upon a closer inspection), the following is what the Pāli Text Society’s Pāli-English Dictionary has to say, anyway, about that particular compound and its constituent words, as an aid to that comprehension. Viz.:
Once again Señor Abraham Velez de Cea is fudging the issue here (as they all do, of course, no matter who they are)
because the unaccented Pāli word atta, in the compound “attabhāva”, is none other than what he elsewhere was at pains to say is
[quote] “its colloquial sense as ‘oneself, ‘myself, ‘yourself, ‘himself’, etc.” [endquote] The psychosomatic self (i.e., psyche-&-soma), in other words. Moreover, this observation is also verifiable via an inspection of the subject matter of the second of the three variations on the theme (i.e., the Nakhasikhopama Sutta) where the sammāsambuddha refers to the each of the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā in turn—in lieu of the “attabhāvapaṭilābha” of the Gomaya Sutta—when he utilises the minute size of an insignificant piece of dust/ dirt/ soil on his finger-tip to illustrate his homily. Needless is it to add, by now, that those panc’upādāna-kkhandhā are anattā (i.e., not-attā) as in, not-self/ not the self. Therefore, what is actually being conveyed in two of the three versions is that were even such a minute amount of “oneself, myself, yourself, himself, etc.” (i.e., the panc’upādāna-kkhandhā personage), such as what a speck of dust/ faeces is, to fit that description—permanent, stable, perpetual, not subject to change, and etcetera—then an ending of being asunder-apart-away from ākāsa, via that austere, celibate and rigorous religio-spiritual/ religio-mystical life-style (known as ‘brahmacariya’ in Buddhism and ‘brahmacharya’ in Hinduism) would not be clear or evident/ not be perceived. Also note how the assertion that liberation from dukkha [quote] “would not be possible (not be perceived)” [endquote]—also supposedly [quote] “explicitly declared” [endquote]—really has to be inferred from the “would not be clear or evident/ not be perceived” English translation of the Pāli word “paññāyetha”. ’Tis fascinating just what lengths these ... um ... these anattāvādans will go to in order to prop up their latter-day (i.e., Abhidhamma-based & Commentary-sourced) ‘no-self’/ ‘no-soul’/ ‘no-spirit’ diṭṭhi/ dṛṣti. And yet that is the very fashion in which the fifth of those alleged “problems”—those which the “philologically acceptable” equivalence of atta & dhamma supposedly “raises”—also turns out to not be one of those half-a-dozen alleged “problems” either.
__________ • An Examen of a (Forthcoming) Doctoral Dissertation 3 ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ Richard’s Text ©1997-. All Rights Reserved. Disclaimer |
